Terrorism and Governance in Kashmir by Sondhi, Sunil
Winter 2004
92




Since 11 September 2001, the United States and its allies have been at war
against an elusive enemy. The Cold War was an entirely different experience, yet
it is not without lessons for the war against terrorism.2 The Soviet collapse was
caused more by developments within the Soviet Union than by the actions of its
adversaries. The war against global terrorism has already achieved important
successes. On the diplomatic front, for example, UN Security Council Resolution
1373 (2001), adopted unanimously, obligates all members to end all terrorist
activity and to bring the perpetrators of terrorism to justice. However, the prob-
lem of terrorism also needs to be tackled from within the states where it takes
roots.
Through Resolution 1373 (2001) the Security Council for the first time
imposed measures not against a state, its leaders, nationals, or commodities, but
against acts of terrorism throughout the world and the terrorists themselves. It is
one of the most expansive resolutions in the history of the council, with a focus
on ensuring that any person who participates in the financing, planning, prepara-
tion, or perpetration of terrorist acts, or who supports terrorist acts, is brought to
justice, and that such acts are established as serious criminal offences in domes-
tic law and regulations with punishments that duly reflect their seriousness.
The council called upon states to submit to the Counter-Terrorism
Committee reports on their implementation of the resolution. The committee has
established subcommittees to review those reports, with the assistance of experts
in relevant fields, and it conducts each review in partnership with the state that
submitted the report. That partnership may lead the committee, United Nations
agencies, and/or certain other states to provide a substantial degree of technical
assistance and cooperation to facilitate the implementation of Resolution 1373
(2001).
Investigators throughout the world have arrested hundreds of individuals
with possible ties to al-Qaeda and other terrorist networks. The threat of future
attacks remains, but the sustained pressure of police work and intelligence gath-
ering, coupled with military operations in Afghanistan, means that al-Qaeda is
on the run and its network is being dismantled cell by cell, cave by cave.
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Drying up the financial sources of terror is vital to ending the terrorist
threat. In fact, financial support has been crucial to the recent spread of terrorist
activities across the continents.3 Following the UN Security Council initiatives
more than 112 nations have issued blocking orders and frozen assets used to
finance terrorism, which have been found everywhere from bank accounts in the
United States to relief organizations in Europe and chains of honey shops in the
Middle East.4 The 29-nation Financial Action Task Force has played a particu-
larly active role in coordinating efforts to identify and stop financial flows to ter-
rorist organizations.
DIVERSE IMPACT IN SOUTH ASIA
Nations have brought their own experiences, concerns, and even policy
differences to the global war against terrorism. That was inevitable, and in many
ways positive; the diversity and flexible nature of this unprecedented coalition is
one of its strengths. However, it has also meant that the impact of the war against
terrorism has varied in different regions and countries.  In the South Asian region
perhaps the most positive impact of the war on terrorism can be seen in Sri
Lanka, which has witnessed significant easing of tensions since September 11.
There is a clear shift in the LTTE’s (Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam) position
on a separate country (Eelam) with its chief, V. Prabhakaran, declaring that his
organisation was neither for separatism nor terrorism. He also indicated that the
LTTE would agree to a political solution within an integrated Sri Lanka, but
would be forced to opt for secession if the conflict was not solved through peace-
ful means. 
Some countries among the international community have imposed restric-
tions on the LTTE since 11 September terrorist attacks in the US. The US attacks,
while unrelated to the LTTE, strengthened the then Sri Lankan government’s
campaign for a global ban on the LTTE. Australia, in December 2001, placed the
LTTE on its list of terrorist organizations in pursuance of its obligations under
Resolution 1373 on the suppression of the financing of terror. On 8 November
2001, following a relentless effort by the Sri Lankan government, Canada also
named the LTTE as a terrorist outfit and the Superintendent of Financial
Institutions in Canada issued a new list that included, for the first time, the LTTE.
The LTTE’s front organizations have a formidable presence in Canada and the
Tamil expatriate community there is considered to be a major source of funds for
the LTTE. Earlier, on 28 February 2001, the British government had proscribed
the LTTE under its new Terrorism Act (2000).5
In Bangladesh a number of transnational Islamist terrorist groups, includ-
ing al-Qaeda, had established a presence in alliance with various militant funda-
mentalist organizations. Investigations into the 22 January 2002, terrorist attacks
on the American Centre in India’s Kolkata brought these linkages to the fore. The
self-styled Asif Reza Commando Force (ARCF), which claimed responsibility
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for the 22 January attack, is essentially a criminal group allied to the Harkat-ul-
Jehadi-e-Islami, Bangladesh (HuJI-BD). The HuJI-BD has very close links with
Pakistan’s external intelligence agency, the Inter Services Intelligence (ISI). The
arrest of Aftab Ansari, alias Aftab Ahmed, alias Farhan Malik, the prime accused
in the American Centre attack, led to further disclosures regarding the interna-
tional linkages between the Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM), Lashkar-e-Toiba (LeT),
and HuJI based in Pakistan and Bangladesh. Ansari is reportedly linked to the ISI
and to Omar Shiekh, a prominent leader of the JeM and prime accused in the
abduction and murder of American journalist Daniel Pearl in Pakistan. These
investigations and disclosures have put the Bangladesh government on alert and
it has agreed to cooperate with other countries in checking terrorist operation
from its soil.6
In Nepal, insurgency reached unprecedented levels during late 2001. At
that time, the Maoists jettisoned the four month-old ceasefire that they had
announced on 23 July 2001, and had launched coordinated countrywide strikes
on the night of 23 November 2001. The worst among the attacks was the mas-
sacre at the Army barracks in Ghorai in which 14 troops were killed and anoth-
er 30 injured. The left-wing extremists also looted 99 self-loading rifles. Also,
the insurgents declared the formation of a “Central People’s Government,”
implying that they had formed a national-level parallel government. The insur-
gents were also running a state within a state in their strongholds, including in
Rolpa, Rukum, Jajarkot, and Salyan districts. It was in these districts that the
insurgency began in 1996. Faced with an unenviable crisis, the Nepalese gov-
ernment declared a nation-wide “State of Emergency” on 26 November and
deployed the Royal Nepal Army to counter the insurgents. The Emergency was
then extended for another three months, with  Parliamentary approval occurring
on 21 February 2002. Nepal has received unqualified support from India in its
counter-insurgency measures and so far it has been able to contain the threat to
its nascent parliamentary democracy.7
MORE OF THE SAME IN KASHMIR     
In the aftermath of the 11 September terrorist attacks in the United States,
links between al-Qaeda, the Taliban, and terrorists active in Jammu and Kashmir
(J&K) were recognized by the global community. It is now being accepted that
transnational networks of terrorist groups are operating as autonomous entities
quite independent of particular national situations.8 Groups, such as the Harkat-
ul-Mujahideen, JeM, and LeT, had direct links with the Taliban and with al-
Qaeda. A large number of members of the Islamist terrorist network were sus-
pected of having crossed over to Kashmir.  
Osama bin Laden’s covert support for terrorist organizations in Kashmir
became overt when he threatened the US with more deaths after 11 September if
it continued to support India. Bin Laden included India in the same category as
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Russia, Serbia, and Israel as “enemies of Islam.”  This statement came close on
the heels of a similarly worded threat to India from Jaish-e-Mohammed (JEM).
Maulana Masood Azhar, the JEM chief, bristled at the freezing of his organiza-
tion’s assets by the USA on 11 October 2001 and said, “We warn them (Indians)
to beware of the mujahideen. We will soon deal them a smashing blow to assert
our authority. We will continue the struggle.”9
In this context, it bears mention that the objectives of the World Islamic
Front for jihad against Jews and Crusaders, established by Osama bin Laden in
1998, are far reaching and these include the liberation of the Middle East from
the “clutches” of Israel; ejection of the USA from the Holy Land of Saudi Arabia;
overthrow of the Saudi monarchy and other corrupt Muslim governments; and,
uniting of all Muslim under the umbrella of the Ummah to transcend national
borders and establish a “Caliphate-style” government.10
After 11 September, India tried  to convince the US administration that the
former was being targeted by the same terror network which inflicted the 11
September attacks on the US, and this common threat emanated from the same
Islamist extremist sources supported by common allies, Pakistan, the Taliban
militia in Afghanistan, and Osama bin Laden. This threat, consequently, required
a common response. While this principle has gained wide acceptance, a degree
of ambivalence has persisted in the US responses, as it has sought to manage
Pakistan in an unlikely role as a frontline state against terrorism.11
Even before the 11 September attacks, the Western focus had been shifting,
albeit inadequately, toward the burgeoning danger of international extremist
Islamist terrorism located in the Pakistan-Afghanistan axis. It is partially this
concern that was reflected in the US State Department’s assertion, in mid-2000,
that the locus of terrorism has shifted from West Asia to South Asia.12
Increased US attention on the sub-continent in the aftermath of 11
September, has revived calls from separatist forces within J&K and Pakistan for
US mediation in the conflict. The US has consistently rejected the idea of medi-
ation unless asked for by all parties involved in the conflict.13 The US adminis-
tration under President George W. Bush endorsed India’s stance that terrorism
was being perpetrated in the state under the façade of a struggle for freedom and
went one step further by declaring groups manned by Pakistani and other foreign
mercenaries, such as the LeT, JeM and HuM, as foreign terrorist organizations
(FTO). In the aftermath of  11 September, the US woke up to the fact that the
Harkat-ul-Ansar (HuA), a group it termed a FTO in 1997 for its links with bin
Laden, was operating in Pakistan under the name of HuM after the proscription.
The HuM was termed as an FTO in October 2001. Then, on 26 December 2001,
the US termed the LeT and the JeM as an FTO. The UK too banned these organ-
izations.
Following this intense international pressure, Pakistan took some steps
against terrorist groups based in its territory and operating in J&K.  They pro-
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ceeded to arrest the top leadership of the JeM and LeT even while permitting the
second line of command to operate freely. JeM chief, Maulana Massod Azhar,
was first detained for a few hours on 26 December 2001 and then arrested again
on 29 December.  The former LeT chief, Hafiz Mohammed Saeed was arrested
on 30 December. These face saving measures were intended to keep the dollars
coming from the US rather than checking cross-border terrorism against India.14
Since the insurgency in J&K began in 1988, India has been consistently
indicating that the state was a theatre for Pakistan’s proxy war. It was only after
the 13 December 2001 terrorist attack on parliament that the Indian government
decided that this proxy war required the threat of a military response and mili-
tary deployment along the border with Pakistan was built up. The consequent
face-off between Indian and Pakistani forces strengthened Western perceptions
of the Kashmir issue as a potential flash-point for a future nuclear confrontation
between India and Pakistan, and the international community urged India to
avoid an armed conflict with Pakistan and to give President Pervez Musharraf
more time to curb the activities of terrorist groups based in his country.15
India’s and Pakistan’s oft-stated positions on Kashmir were vigorously
stated within the context of the 11 September attacks. Pakistani President
Musharraf, while going public on his support for the US in its global campaign
against bin Laden and the Taliban, claimed that this course was being adopted to
prevent harm to Pakistan’s “Kashmir cause.”  In an interview on 2 October 2001,
when asked about the changing focus of terrorism to Kashmir, he stated that this
would be the most contentious issue and “it will not be accepted at all” in
Pakistan.
The cosmetic changes within Pakistan in the post 11 September phase have
failed to restrain the jehadi groups and there has been a continuous succession of
attacks in India. In the 13 December attack on India’s parliament, four fedayeen
(suicide) terrorists of the JeM drove an explosives laden car into the Parliament
compound and opened fire. Their entry into the Parliament building was pre-
vented by Border Security Force personnel. Although one of the fedayeen blew
himself up, this failed to cause any major casualties. (Eight BSF personnel and a
member of the parliament staff were killed along with the fedayeen.)  India has
stated that the JeM, in collusion with the LeT, had carried out the attack. 
In its 1 October attack on the Srinagar legislature complex, a JeM feday-
een detonated an explosives laden car outside the complex gate. In the ensuing
confusion, three JeM fedayeen entered the complex and fortified themselves
within. They fired indiscriminately until they were killed by the security forces.
Thirty-eight persons, including the four fedayeen, were killed in this attack.
Despite several peace initiatives and international pressure on Pakistan to abjure
terrorism as a foreign policy instrument, terrorist violence has been on the rise in
J&K. As a result, 1,067 civilians, 590 security forces personnel, and 2,850 ter-
rorists were killed in 2001. This was only a continuation of the escalating trends
in year 2000, when peace initiatives failed to check the levels of violence. 
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FRACTURED PEACE INITIATIVES
Several peace initiatives have been undertaken in recent years to address
the Kashmir issue. Through an official statement on 5 April 2001, the Indian
government invited all Kashmiri groups to participate in negotiations to end the
crisis. Two days prior to this, former Union Home Minister L.K. Advani,
announced the nomination of K.C. Pant, Deputy Chairman of the Planning
Commission, as the government’s candidate for the proposed talks. Initially dis-
playing confusion, the All Party Hurriyat Conference (APHC) failed to issue an
official reaction to the government’s invitation for talks, and eventually, on 26
April, rejected the government’s offer for talks. 
This position was an endorsement of the views expressed by several
Hurriyat leaders, including its then Chairman Abdul Ghani Bhat, who rejected
the invitation for two reasons: first, the government had failed to permit a pro-
posed APHC delegation visit to Pakistan to confer with terrorist groups based in
that country; and second, the invitation was open to all Kashmiri bodies, which
meant that the government was not willing to endorse the Hurriyat’s self-pro-
claimed mandate as the “sole genuine representative” of the state’s people. The
Hurriyat’s official rejection stated: “We are ready to enter into a dialogue with
the Centre provided we are allowed to go to Pakistan, and New Delhi accepts
Hurriyat Conference as the only representative body in Jammu and Kashmir.”
Stressing the second point, the statement added that the alliance “. . . is not ready
to join the crowded train which goes nowhere.”16
Abandoning moves to involve the Hurriyat in negotiations, the government
decided to respond to the series of signals emanating from Islamabad, which said
that the Pakistan government’s wanted a summit level meeting on Kashmir. The
Indian government’s announcement, which ended the Ramadan ceasefire, also
invited Pakistan’s Chief Executive and thereafter President, Musharraf, to visit
India for a composite dialogue, including the Kashmir issue. Responding to this
invitation, Musharraf, who assumed his country’s presidency on 20 June 2001,
visited India in July 2001. The ensuing summit was variously interpreted as
being either inconclusive or a failure.
Despite peace initiatives and international pressure on Pakistan to abjure
terrorism as a foreign policy instrument, terrorist violence continued in J&K. In
2001, 1,067 civilians, 590 security personnel, and 2,850 terrorists were killed.17
This showed that peace initiatives do not necessarily imply a respite from vio-
lence. Casualties in 2001, both among security forces and terrorists, were well
above the figures for 2000. The increase in civilian casualties, however, was
marginal, and there was also a decline in the total number of incidents recorded.
But total casualties were significantly higher, underlining the increased focus and
lethality of violence in the state. The casualties suffered by the security forces
showed the most dramatic increase followed by terrorist casualties. The year




The pattern continued in 2002 with terrorist violence erupting whenever
peace moves were initiated. While 44 percent of the voters turned out to vote dur-
ing the State Assembly election in October 2002, the state’s cleanest elections
were also its bloodiest. In 45 days of campaigning, 46 political activists were
killed. Most of them, including a state minister, belonged to the ruling National
Conference party.  During 2002, approximately 839 civilians and 469 security
forces personnel were killed, and some 1,714 terrorists were killed by the secu-
rity forces in counter-terrorism operations. 
The new Chief Minister, Mufti Mohammed Sayeed, took two steps soon
after coming to power:  a freeze on the Prevention of Terrorist Activities Act and
the release of militants. These are the cornerstones of his much-vaunted policy
of the “healing touch.”  The tactic was to first to put down “the internal fire of
discontent and alienation” in Kashmir, a significant break from the security-cen-
tric approach of the past.
However, these initiatives met with immediate response from the terrorists.
It began with a suicide attack on a CRPF camp in Srinagar on 22 November. The
next day the militants blew up an army bus and on 24 November terrorists
wreaked havoc on the historic Raghunath temple in Jammu, the state’s winter
capital. Together, they accounted for 34 lost lives. What followed was an acri-
monious controversy over the state government’s decision to release 24 jailed
militants. There were strong indications that the setbacks on the security front
could force the chief minister to abandon plans to free more militants.19
Meanwhile, over 400,000 Kashmiri Pandits out of an original population
in the Kashmir Valley of 425,000 prior to 1989 continued to be displaced.
Official records indicate that some 216,820 of them lived as migrants in
makeshift camps at Jammu, another 143,000 at Delhi and thousands of others are
now dispersed across the country. Many of those registered at the camps have
also been dispersed according to the exigencies of employment and opportuni-
ties for education, trade, or business. There has been little effort made to facili-
tate their return to the valley in recent years, as earlier attempts were neutralized
by brutal campaigns of selective murder, including the killing of seven Pandits
at Sangrama in Budgam district in March 1997, three at Gul in Udhampur dis-
trict in June 1997, 26 in the massacre at Wandhama in Srinagar district in January
1998, and 26 at Prankote in Udhampur district in April 1998. 
The possibility of reversing the terrorist’s ethnic cleansing of the valley
remains remote, and there are now reports of a hidden migration from some of
the border areas in the Jammu region where the Hindus are a minority. This exo-
dus gained momentum after the gruesome killing of another 24 Kashmiri Pandits
in March 2003. These people, including 11 women and two children, were bru-
tally massacred at Nadimarg village in south Kashmir on the night of 24 March
2003, pushing the valley back onto a path of blood and violence. Perhaps the
most distressing part of the incident was that it all happened in the compound of
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a police post set up for the protection of the minority Hindu community. Of the
nine policemen supposed to be guarding the Hindus, three were absent. Others
were asleep.20
As part of the Composite Dialogue between Pakistan and India, talks on
combating terrorism and dealing with the menace of narcotics and drug cartels
were held on 10-11 August 2004 at Islamabad. On these sensitive issues very lit-
tle could be expected to emerge in the first round of talks. India and Pakistan
reaffirmed their determination to combat terrorism and emphasized the need to
eliminate this menace. As expected, there was no headway, however, on the issue
of terrorism as both sides had divergent positions on what “terrorism” meant.
Pakistan and India, for political reasons, define “terrorism” in different ways and
it was therefore difficult to arrive at a consensus in the first round of talks.
THE GOVERNANCE IMPERATIVE
One of the reasons why terrorist and subversive groups continue to survive
and thrive in Kashmir is that the people are no longer willing to tolerate the
inequity, poverty, and corruption in which the state has been mired.  Disgusted
with the governments and despairing of the prospect for peaceful and incremen-
tal change within the existing order, the people are looking for an explanation of
their personal suffering and societal degradation. The eruption of militancy in
Kashmir during the late 1980s was not a sudden outburst but the cumulative
result of various twists and turns in the state’s politics over many years.  If one
wants to understand the growth of militancy in Kashmir, one has to bear in mind
that it is both spontaneous as well as a result of some external planning. The
denial of basic human needs like a genuine, decent livelihood, civil liberties, and
federal autonomy to the people of Kashmir, alienated them from the Indian
nation and subsequently, they crossed over to the side of militancy. Pakistan, a
traditional rival in the dispute of Kashmir, took advantage of the situation. It not
only gave military training to young Kashmiri Muslims but also provided sophis-
ticated weapons. After their return, these young men started an armed struggle in
Kashmir.
There is little doubt that with force, vigilance, and some luck, India will be
able to substantially destroy and disrupt the existing cross-border network of ter-
rorism operating in Kashmir.  But no amount of military force, territorial vigi-
lance, and operational genius can contain a group of suicide attackers that
stretches endlessly across borders and over time.  India must ultimately under-
mine their capacity to recruit and indoctrinate new true believers.  That requires
dealing with the factors that help in spreading terrorism.  And one of the princi-
pal factors is chronically bad governance. 
The plain and even brutal fact is that the political and administrative sys-
tem in Jammu and Kashmir, like several other states in India, has been a failure.
Political parties in Kashmir have used all means and broken rules at will in their
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quest for power and wealth.  Ministers worry first about the money they can col-
lect and only second about whether their decisions have any value for the public.
Legislators are known to have collected bribes to vote for bills. Even military
officers are alleged to have ordered weapons on the basis of how large the kick-
back will be.  There are instances where soldiers and policemen have extorted
rather than defended the public.  In Kashmir, the line between the police and the
criminals is a thin one, and at times may not exist at all. 
Most institutions of civil governance in the state, already weakened by
inefficiency and corruption, have suffered a complete breakdown in the face of
the terrorist onslaught. This includes the state’s prosecution department and judi-
ciary, which, after nearly 14 years of terrorist strife, (11,850 civilians and 3,460
security forces personnel killed and thousands of others injured in the state as a
result of terrorist activities until the end of the year 2001), has had just 303
undertrials and has pronounced only 13 convictions in cases related to terrorism.
Only five of these convictions relate to serious offences, while the others are all
for such relatively minor offences as illegal possession of arms and illegal bor-
der crossing.21
In fact, in the state of Jammu and Kashmir several government institutions
are a façade. The police does not enforce the law. Judges do not decide the law.
Custom officials do not inspect the goods. Manufacturers do not produce,
bankers do not invest, borrowers do not repay, and contracts are not enforced.
Most transactions are twisted to take immediate advantage.  Time horizons are
extremely short because no one has any confidence in the collectivity and its
future.  This is pure opportunism: get what you can now.  Government does not
seem like a public enterprise but a criminal conspiracy, and organized crime has
heavily penetrated politics and government.  In this context, neither democracy
nor development can be sustained. Kashmir is a clear example of the absence of
civic traditions that are so essential to make democracy work.22
It is, then, no coincidence that ethnic violence, religious blood letting, and
civil unrest are tightly entwined with the corruption of cynical leaders. The inca-
pacitated state in Kashmir cannot sustain democracy, for sustainable democracy
requires constitutionalism and respect for the law. Nor can it generate sustainable
economic growth, for that requires people with financial capital to invest in pro-
ductive activity.  In this state of disorder, private companies do not get rich
through productive activity and honest enterprise. They get rich by manipulating
power and privilege, by stealing from the state, exploiting the weak, and shirk-
ing the law. Thus, it is no wonder that such a weak and porous state has not been
very successful in combating terrorism.23
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BRINGING THE STATE BACK IN 
It is difficult to resist the temptation to think that the problem is rooted in
the culture of this state, or perhaps of the nation, and that there is not much any-
one can do about it.  It is true that the state will neither develop its economy nor
consolidate its democratic system until its culture changes, but it is wrong to pre-
sume that cultural change must lead the way out of the predatory trap. 
Cultures change only slowly, but institutions can be altered rapidly.  And
culture will adapt to new institutional incentives if the institutions work effec-
tively to generate new expectations and norms.  Through civic education and
organizational efforts new, more civic norms can be generated.  But these will be
sustainable only if the institutions of a civic community come into being.24 The
state of Jammu and Kashmir needs to be completely overhauled institutionally.
The institutions that generate a rule of law and a climate of peace, pre-
dictability, and order are: an independent and professional judicial system; a
transparent and efficient banking system (including an independent central
bank); effective rules, regulations, and oversight agencies governing banking,
capital markets, and commerce; rules and institutions to restrain corruption by
monitoring and when necessary punishing the conduct of public officials; a sys-
tem of domestic policing that enables people to invest, produce, and exchange
free of extortion from the state or criminals; and a tax system that collects suffi-
cient revenue to finance these and other public good.25 In his seminal book on
globalization, The Lexus and the Olive Tree, Thomas Friedman calls these insti-
tutions the “software that accompanies a country’s basic hardware” and its “oper-
ating system.”26 In the context of this discussion, we can call this software an
institutional resource in that it facilitates the creation and efficient application of
all other forms off resources. 
A crucial place to begin is with the institutions of “horizontal accountabil-
ity.” This is the process by which some state actors hold other state actors
accountable to the law, the constitution, and norms of good governance. Some of
the key institutions in this regard are the judiciary, the central bank, and related
oversight institutions, and the electoral commission.  These institutions must be
resourceful, professionally led and staffed, and independent of political manipu-
lation and control if they are to function effectively.  The most urgently impor-
tant institutions of horizontal accountability are the ones directly charged with
controlling political and bureaucratic corruption. Corruption is the core phenom-
enon of the failed administration in Jammu and Kashmir, as indeed in other states
like Bihar and Uttar Pradesh in India.  It is the principal means by which state
officials extract wealth from society, deter productive activity and thereby repro-
duce poverty and dependency. 
Apart from government officials, landed elites, corporate and political
leaders, and organized criminal gangs also use corruption to purchase access to
resources and immunity from the law.  Politicians use corruption to barricade
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themselves in power.  Patrons distribute the “crumbs” of corruption to maintain
their client groups. Corruption is to the weak state what the blood supply is to a
malignant tumor.  Cut it of and the tumor will shrink and die.  Cutting it off will
be a long, contested process.  But powerful, well-designed institutions can make
a difference.  What is needed most of all is an independent anti-corruption
agency.  This commission would receive declarations of assets by all significant
public officials on a regular basis; and have the staffing, technology, and politi-
cal will to monitor those declarations and prosecute cases of corrupt accumula-
tion and concealment of wealth before an independent tribunal.
Such a commission must vigorously monitor the conduct of public officials
in every respect, backed up by a state audit commission to audit all public
accounts and an ombudsman’s commission to receive and investigate pubic com-
plaints.  It must have the authority and resources to prosecute as well. The insti-
tutions of horizontal accountability form a self-reinforcing web. An anti-corrup-
tion commission must rely in part on the audit agency to uncover theft and mis-
use of public resources, and on the ombudsman to invite and investigate public
complaints.  Reduction and deterrence of corruption will be reinforced if an elec-
toral commission can produce sufficiently clean elections to enable citizens to
turn out of office the most corrupt public officials. It is a mistake to think that the
impoverished masses at the bottom of the corrupted system are so fragmented
and hoodwinked that they will happily settle for whatever corrupt patronage
comes their way.27
People do learn over time that the system is exploiting them, and informa-
tion about corruption and injustices does move around rapidly. Or at least it can
move around if there is some freedom of information in terms of a pluralistic
press and free access to the electronic media.  The importance of free and fair
elections and free mass media underscores a fundamental point about controlling
corruption and exploitation. In Kashmir, accountability cannot succeed if the ini-
tiative for it comes only from within the state sector.  Horizontal accountability
must be reinforced by vertical accountability. In addition to competitive elections
and the mass media, NGOs have to play a crucial role in monitoring the conduct
of public officials and holding them accountable for their performance in office. 
No infusion of economic resources, no matter how massive and sustained,
will in itself generate development in Kashmir because the problem is not sim-
ply a lack of resources or functioning infrastructure.  The problem is a more fun-
damental shortage: of the institutions and norms of democracy and good gover-
nance. Unless the state of Jammu and Kashmir is helped to develop institutions
that collect taxes, limit corruption, control crime, enforce laws, secure property
rights, provide education, attract investment, and answer to their own people, the
state will not develop and the flow of terrorists from across the border will not
subside.  This is why the government must not only substantially increase the
development budget, but also devote a much larger portion of that budget to
democracy and a good-governance program.28
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The global war on terrorism has won a victory in freeing the people of
Afghanistan from the medieval tyranny of the Taliban. The United Nations has
certainly degraded and disrupted the terrorist infrastructure of al-Qaeda. Other
military and intelligence challenges lie ahead.  But the challenge India and the
world face is as much political as military. In Kashmir it lies in the daunting task
of helping to reconstruct a failed state and constructing for the first time a sys-
tem of government that is decent, responsible, consensual and, ultimately demo-
cratic. The war on terrorism cannot stop at military victories.  India must help
and induce the predatory and messy administration in Jammu and Kashmir to
develop civic institutions and norms. Only then will the state be able to sustain
good governance and development progress, and thereby regain the confidence
of the people.  Only then can India achieve a lasting victory in the war against
terrorism. This is a lesson from Kashmir for the global war on terrorism.
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